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The increasing concentration of wealth and economic power calls for policy action to tame the
rise of “private leviathans”. Rabah Arezki, Asif Islam and Grégoire Rota-Graziosi argue that,
following commodity booms, regulation, especially pertaining to competition, is found to limit
concentration of wealth while taxation has little effect. This is consistent with the primacy of
ex-ante (preventive) interventions over ex-post (after-the-fact) ones for addressing wealth
inequality.
 
In the late 19th century United States, rising inequality, social tensions and oligarchy led the
federal government to reinvent itself as a regulator. The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 is the
foundational federal statute in the development of U.S. competition law. At the time, the gilded
age called for a forceful response by the federal government to curb the rising power of the so-
called robber barons, including Cornelius Vanderbilt, John D. Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie.
Fast forward to today, the global rise of a class of billionaires coupled with heightened social
tensions raises important questions about what to do about top wealth and income inequality
(Wu, 2018). Concentration of wealth threatens political power, and that is irrespective of
political systems. From public auditions in the United States to imprisonment in Saudi-Arabia
and Russia, and disappearance in China, billionaires have been in the line of sight of the
powers that be.
In a recent paper (Arezki, Islam and Rota-Graziosi, 2021), we explore the interplay between top
wealth and policies, namely regulation and taxation, exploiting variation in exposure to
international commodity prices.
Commodity booms and billionaires
Several factors drive top income and wealth inequality, namely globalisation, technology,
labour market institutions, decline in competition and  scal policy—or, generally, social norms
regarding pay inequality. There are also legal roots to top income inequalities that might
explain the pervasive higher returns to capital compared to the rate of GDP growth. On the
normative front, there is a heated debate on the best approach to address the rise in top
incomes. The dominant approach is either to address institutional factors favouring the ability
of top income earners to channel rents their way or to reduce the returns to rent seeking by
increasing marginal rates of taxation on high incomes. More recently, a debate has been raging
on the use of a wealth tax as an instrument to reduce top incomes (Saez and Zucman, 2019).
We document that different institutional arrangements lead to a differentiated effect of
(plausibly) exogenous commodity price  uctuations on top incomes. To do so, we combine a
global panel data set from Forbes magazine on billionaires’ net worth with an index of
(country-speci c) commodity terms of trade shocks. Commodity shocks are signi cant
sources of macroeconomic variation but also have important sectoral implications that
elucidate linkages with concentration of income at the top. Results show that commodity
booms lead to top income concentration, and the effect is economically large. Figure 1(a)
globally traces the patterns of commodity shocks and the log differences of billionaire net
worth and shows that they co-move. Figure 1(b) replicates the same pattern for developed (left
panel) and developing economies (right panel) and shows the positive relationship between
commodity price shocks and top incomes stand, regardless of the level of development.
This  nding is robust to accounting for sector of activity as well as the individual
characteristics of billionaires as captured by billionaire  xed effects. The evidence is also
suggestive that competition policy weakens the relationship between commodity booms and
top incomes, and tax policy has no effect.
Indeed, competition policies and antitrust laws combined with strong enforcement
mechanisms have a potentially powerful role to play in shaping the structure of an economy
and society over and beyond taxation and redistribution policies. Indeed, protected sectors,
cartels or collusion limit the impetus for investment, innovation, and growth (see Aghion and
Gri ths, 2005).
Figure 1a. Log differences of billionaire net worth and commodity
shocks
Figure 1b. Log differences of billionaire net worth and commodity
shocks – developing vs developed economies
Sources: Forbes Magazine Database (2001 to 2018);  Gruss et al. (2019).
Resource curse and top wealth
The “resource curse” literature has provided (mixed) empirical evidence that countries with
large dependence on natural resources grow slower and are also more unequal. Importantly,
Mehlum, et al (2006) provide evidence that the effect of natural resources on the economy
depends on the quality of institutions. Furthermore, the type of natural resource matters, with
hydrocarbon and mineral resources categorised as “point source” resources, having a more
detrimental impact on growth than “diffuse” resources such as agriculture. We contribute to
this literature by focusing on the top incomes as opposed to general income inequality while
exploring the role of different policy/institutional frameworks. We also  nd that commodity
price shocks emanating from point-source resources lead to more top income concentration
than shocks stemming from diffuse resources.
Further, we  nd that commodity price shocks reduce non-resource taxes, both direct and
indirect. Our  ndings relate to the volatility of public budgets due to commodity price volatility
and the resource curse in terms of public  nances. James (2015) establishes a negative
relationship between resource and non-resource revenues as the expression of a crowding out
effect between these sources of revenue in US states. Our  ndings further document that
certain institutional arrangements such as competition policy framework can help curb the rise
in the concentration of wealth.
 Capital mobility and tax havens as the main sources of leakages
Globalisation has led to a signi cant decrease in the cost of international capital mobility. In
turn, this has fuelled intense tax competition, which offers multiple opportunities to shift
pro ts to wealth in tax-accommodating countries or tax havens. Any tax coordination at the
international level is rendered di cult or nearly impossible. This may explain why taxation
appears less e cient than regulation to tame top wealth inequalities. Ten per cent of world
wealth is held in tax havens. Andersen et al. (2017)  nd that around 15% of the windfall gains
accruing to petroleum-producing countries with autocratic rulers is diverted to secret
accounts.
The emerging debate on curbing top incomes has centred around the wealth tax. There is
indeed a strong theoretical case for a wealth tax especially after calamities such as wars and
pandemics, yet its implementation and effectiveness have been challenged. Indeed, with the
advent of  nancial globalization, capital markets provide multiple options of tax avoidance or
evasion. We  nd empirically that (both resource and non-resource) taxation do not moderate
the effect of commodity booms on top incomes.
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